Siddharth Varadarajan

Journalist | Writer | Analyst

Gov/1621 – The full text

Article 29 of the Indian safeguards agreement ties the termination of the agreement to the conditions outlined in an obscure document of the IAEA Governing Board. I am now making it available online for the first time (of course, it’s been around in books, but who reads those anymore?!). For those who missed it, my analysis of this document is here. For the text of the document alone, see below.

Duration and termination of INFCIRC/66 agreements

Item 1(b) of the provisional agenda (GOV/1620)

SAFEGUARDS

(b) THE FORMULATION OF CERTAIN PROVISIONS IN AGREEMENTS UNDER THE AGENCY’S SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM (1965, AS PREVIOUSLY EXTENDED IN 1966 AND 1968)

Memoradum by the Director General

1. A substantial number of Governors have urged that there should be a greater degree of statndarisation than in the past with respect to the duration and termination of such agreements as may henceforth be concluded under the Agency’s Safeguards System (1965, as Provisionally Extended in 1966 and 1968)1 for the application of safeguards in connection with nuclear material, equipment, facilities or non-nuclear material supplied to States by third parties. To achieve this, it is recommended that the following two concepts should be reflected in there agreements:
(a) That the duration of the agreement should be related to the period of actual use of the items in the recipient State; and
(b) That the provisions for terminating the agreement should be formulated in such a way that the rights and obligations of the parties continue to apply in connection with supplied nuclear material and with special fissionable material produced, processed or used in or in connection with supplied nuclear material, equipment, facilities or non-nuclear material, until such time as the Agency has terminated the application of safeguards thereto, in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 26 or 27 of the Agency’s Safeguarded System.

A short exposition with respect to the application of these concepts in annexed hereto.

2. The proposed standardization would appear likely to facilitate the uniform application of safeguards measures. It is furthermore to be noted that the combined operation of the two concepts would be consistent with the application of the general principle embodied in paragraph 16 of the Agency’s Safeguards System.

Requested action by the Board

3. In bringing this matter to the Board’s attention, the Director General seeks the views of the Board as to whether it concurs with the two concepts set out in paragraph 1 above.

ANNEX

1. In the case of receipt by a State of source or special fissionable material, equipment facilities or non-nucler material from a supplier outside that State, the duration of the relevant agreement under the Agency’s Safeguards System would be related to the actual use in the recipient State of the material or items supplied. This may be accomplished by requiring, in accordance with present practice, that the material or items supplied be listed in the inventory called for by the agreement.

2. The primary effect of termination of the agreement, either by act of the parties or effluxion of time, would be that no further supplied nuclear material, equipment, facilities or non-nuclear material could be added to the inventory. On the other hand, the rights and obligations of the parties, as provided for in the agreement, would continue to apply in connection with any supplied material or items and with any special fissionable material produced, processed or used in or in connection with any supplied material or items which had been included in the inventory, until such material or items had been removed from the inventory.

3. With respect to nuclear material, conditions for removal are those set out in paragraph 26 or 27 of the Agency’s Safeguards System; with respect to equipment, facilities and non-nuclear material, conditions for removal could be based on paragraph 26. A number of agreements already concluded have prescribed such conditions in part, by providing for deletion from the inventory of nuclear material, equipment and facilities which are returned to the supplying State or transferred (under safeguards) to a third State. The additional provisions contemplated would stipulate that items or non-nuclear material could be removed from the purview of the agreement if they had been consumed, were no longer usable for any nuclear activity relevant from from the point of view of safeguards or had become practically irrecoverable.

4. The effect of reflecting the two concepts in agreements would be that special fissionable material which had been produced, processed or used in or in connection with supplied material or items before they were removed from the scope of the agreement, would remain or be listed in the inventory, and such special fissionable material, together with any supplied nuclear material remaining in the inventory, would be subject to safeguards until the Agency had terminated safeguards on that special fissionable and nuclear material in accordance with the provisions of the Agency’s Safeguards System. Thus, the actual termination of the operation of the provisions of the agreement would take place only when everything had been removed from the inventory.

Note:
1. The Agency’s Safeguards System (1965, as Provisionally Extended in 1966 and 1968) set forth in document INFCIRC/66/Rev. 2.

Source: Appendix VI of Safeguarding the Atom: A Critical Appraisal, edited by Jozef Goldblat (Taylor & Francis, 1985).

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2 comments on “Gov/1621 – The full text

  1. Anonymous
    July 15, 2008

    But has not India been saying from day one that it is committing to perpetual safeguards and its right to corrrective measures in case perpetual fuel does not come? If anyhting, Indians have been upfront about this point all along.

  2. Anonymous
    July 15, 2008

    Siddharth, the point you belabour is valid. This would indeed have been a loophole/way out in case of fuel supply disruptions, but it is effectively plugged by article 32 of the draft India specific agreement. Your interpretation of art 29 ( which seems to be valid) does not override 32. I guess it was never the idea, way back in 2005, to seek a way around safeguards in perpetuity by thinking of some textual formulation in an agreemnt which was to come 3 years down the line. safeguards in perpetuity is an integral part of the deal, and unless we, right from the word go, had in mind that we will not respect it, we should be prepared to accept it. Dishonest intentions are not the stuff a country like India should conduct its foreign policy with.

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This entry was posted on July 14, 2008 by in Uncategorized.

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